Peter Thiel once said, “We were promised flying cars, and instead we got 140 characters.”

If progress were a straight road, mankind would’ve paved it, tolled it, and declared war over who gets to drive first. We measure genius not by what we create, but by how fast we can turn it into a weapon. And then we act surprised when the world doesn’t look like The Jetsons.

When I was a kid, Popular Mechanics swore that by the year 2000, we’d all be soaring to work like futuristic birds. Well, it’s 2025 now, and though we’re inching closer—maybe by 2035—we’ll finally lift off.

But here’s the question: why has it taken so long?

My theory is simple. For the past 75 years, humanity’s been too busy preparing for war, fighting wars, or picking up the pieces after one. We’ve built faster jets, stronger bombs, and more efficient ways to destroy each other—yet still struggle to build a city that runs without poisoning its own air.

Imagine if even a fraction of those trillions had gone to curing diseases, exploring the stars, or powering the planet cleanly. We might have cities on Mars and free energy for all. But instead, we’ve spent our brightest minds designing better ways to end civilization rather than advance it.

We were promised flying cars.
We got drones, debt, and digital shouting matches instead.
Maybe someday, when we finally tire of fighting each other, we’ll rediscover the real frontier—not the sky above us, but the peace beneath our feet. Until then, we’ll keep dreaming of flight while grounded by our own foolishness.

Major wars since 1914 — spending and deaths

World War I (1914–1918) — ~21–22M dead (≈8.5M military; up to ~13M civilians). Spending: Allies ~$147B + Central ~$61B in 1914–18 dollars (often cited); very rough conversion implies ~$6–7T in 2025 dollars using CPI. (Encyclopedia Britannica)
World War II (1939–1945) — ~40–60M+ dead. Spending: U.S. cost ≈ $4.7T (2019$) per CRS; global cost higher. (Encyclopedia Britannica)
Russian Civil War (1917–1923) — ~7–12M dead (incl. famine/disease). Reliable global spending figures aren’t available. (Consensus ranges across histories.)
Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) — ~0.5M dead. (No robust total spending series.)
Chinese Civil War (1945–1949, major phase) — ~1.5–2M+ direct deaths. (Spending not robustly aggregated.)
Korean War (1950–1953) — ~1.5–3M dead. U.S. cost ≈ $341B (FY2011$) per CRS. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
Vietnam War (1955–1975) — ~2–3M+ dead (Vietnamese); 58,220 U.S. U.S. spending: ~$352B nominal; ≈$738B (FY2011$); some analyses show higher when including wider costs. (Encyclopedia Britannica)
Soviet–Afghan War (1979–1989) — ~1–2M dead (Afghans). (No single, trusted global spending figure.)
Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) — ~500k killed; total casualties up to 1–2M. (Economic costs are disputed; often cited as extremely large but not reliably totaled.) (Encyclopedia Britannica)
Gulf War (1990–1991) — ~25k–100k Iraqi dead (mil/civ) + ~300 Coalition; Total cost ≈ $120B; U.S. net ≈ $61B after partner reimbursements (GAO/CRS summaries). (Harvard Scholar)
Yugoslav Wars (1991–2001) — ~130k–140k dead across conflicts (e.g., Bosnia ~100k). (Spending not cleanly consolidated.) (UCDP/OWID) (Our World in Data)
Second Congo War & aftermath (1998–2003 +) — ~5.4M excess deaths (mostly disease/famine amid conflict). (PMC)
Afghanistan (U.S.-led, 2001–2021) — ~176k+ direct deaths (all sides; est.). U.S. post-9/11 wars total ≈ $8T (includes Afghanistan, Iraq/Syria, interest, veterans’ care). (brown.edu)
Iraq War (2003–2011; insurgency beyond) — ~200k–600k+ deaths (estimates vary widely). U.S. cost: ~$0.8–$2.0T+ (narrow to broad). $3T+ when broader macro/veterans costs included (Stiglitz & Bilmes). (FAS Project on Government Secrecy)
Syrian Civil War (2011– ) — ~500k+ total documented deaths; >200k civilians (SOHR/SNHR). (Wikipedia)
Yemen War (2014– ) — ~377k total deaths incl. indirect (UNDP, 2021). (The Guardian)
Russia–Ukraine full-scale war (2022– ) — Hundreds of thousands of deaths (combatants + civilians; estimates vary). Recovery/reconstruction need: ~$524B as of Dec 31, 2024 (RDNA4). (World Bank)

“All wars since 1914” is enormous (hundreds of conflicts). Above are the largest/highest-impact wars with the best-documented spending and death tallies.
Spending figures often exist by participant (e.g., U.S.) rather than global totals; where so, I cite participant totals (CRS/Brown).
Deaths vary by method (battle deaths vs. excess mortality including famine/disease). I favor Britannica/UCDP/OWID/UN style ranges and call out when they’re documented vs. estimated.

What the totals look like (in today’s dollars)

War/operations since 1914 (direct costs of the major wars):
at least $40–70 trillion (2024–2025 USD) — a conservative floor built from WWI, WWII, Korea, Vietnam, the 1990–91 Gulf War, the post-9/11 wars, and large civil wars. (Details and sources below.)
Defense (standing militaries) since 1914:
roughly $80–100+ trillion (constant-dollar terms). This comes from back-of-envelope summing of the SIPRI global military-expenditure series (which covers 1949–2024) and adding a modest allowance for 1914–1948 outside the huge, already-counted wartime surges. (Method and sources below.)

These are ranges, not precise point estimates, because: (1) different countries report differently; (2) many wars have poorly measured non-DoD costs; (3) conversions to “today’s dollars” vary by deflator.

Big wars (direct “war” costs)

World War I (1914–1918): common totals for belligerents ≈ $200B in 1914–18 dollars; CPI-inflate gives ~$5–7T today (range depends on index). Deaths ≈ 21–22M. (The Library of Congress)
World War II (1939–1945): U.S. cost ≈ $4–4.7T in today’s dollars (CRS-based). Global totals are multiple times U.S.; even a conservative multiple puts global WWII well into the tens of trillions in today’s dollars. Deaths ≈ 40–60M+. (Norwich University Online)
Korean War (1950–1953): U.S. ≈ $341B (FY2011$); global deaths ≈ 1.5–3M.
Vietnam War (1955–1975): U.S. ≈ $738B (FY2011$); deaths in the millions.
1990–91 Gulf War: ~$120B total; U.S. net ≈ $61B after allied reimbursements.
Post-9/11 wars (Afghanistan, Iraq/Syria, related): U.S. ≈ $8T through 2021 including DoD, veterans, interest and DHS components. (brown.edu)

Add to those the large civil wars (e.g., Yugoslav wars, Second Congo War, Syria, Yemen, Russia–Ukraine), whose financial costs are poorly consolidated, but whose human costs are well documented (Bosnia ~100k; DRC ~5.4M excess deaths; Syria 500k+; Yemen ~377k incl. indirect; Russia–Ukraine hundreds of thousands; Ukraine reconstruction needs alone ~$524B as of end-2024). These underline why a $40–70T floor for direct war/operations is reasonable. (Norwich University Online)

Defense (standing militaries)

For global defense spending, the gold-standard time series is SIPRI, which gives annual world totals from 1949–2024. 2024 alone was $2.718T, up 9.4% YoY; 2023 was $2.44T. Summing the series across decades (earlier years much lower than today) yields a back-of-envelope ~$70–90T (constant dollars) for 1949–2024. Adding a modest allowance for 1914–1948 peacetime outlays (on top of WWI/WWII operational surges already counted above) puts the 1914–2024 defense total plausibly in the $80–100+T range. (SIPRI)

Bottom line

Since 1914, the world has likely spent well over $40–70T on fighting wars directly, and on the order of $80–100+T on maintaining militaries—and both figures are conservative given data gaps.
2024 defense spending alone was $2.718T, a record, and the tenth straight yearly rise. (SIPRI)

It still amazes me: we pour trillions each year into the business of not fighting—armies to prevent wars, weapons to keep the peace, alarms to make us feel safe while we sleep. I’m no pacifist preacher; I’ll admit I’ve argued that a bigger stick keeps the wolves polite. But let’s not kid ourselves—play long enough at the world’s roulette table and sooner or later the ball lands on double-zero. Deterrence becomes temptation, accidents dress up as decisions, and the bill comes due in lives.

What a squandered genius: all that steel and code could have lit cities, healed bodies, and carried us to the stars. Instead we’ve engineered elaborate ways to stand still with swagger. It could have been better—can still be—if we ever decide that the highest form of strength isn’t outgunning the neighbor, but outbuilding the future. Until then, we’ll keep buying insurance against ourselves and calling it wisdom.

© 2025 insearchofyourpassions.com - Some Rights Reserve - This website and its content are the property of YNOT. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. You are free to share and adapt the material for any purpose, even commercially, as long as you give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made.

How much did you like this post?

Click on a star to rate it!