The money enters Cuba. The food enters Cuba. The hotels are built. The problem is not the absence of resources — it is who controls them.--YNOT!
To understand Cuba’s deep crisis, we have to move beyond ideological slogans and look at the facts: the economic data, the internal power structure, and the way resources are actually controlled on the island.
The crisis is often blamed entirely on a suffocating external siege — the so-called “blockade.” But the reality is more complicated, and far more revealing. Cuba’s collapse is not simply the product of foreign pressure or abstract ideology. It is the result of decades of centralized control, economic mismanagement, and the predatory use of national resources by a military elite.
Embargo vs. Blockade: A Necessary Distinction
The first step is to use the correct terms.
From a legal and technical standpoint, Cuba does not face a true “blockade,” which would mean total military and physical isolation. What exists is a unilateral commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States.
That distinction matters.
Cuba trades with much of the world, including Canada, the European Union, China, Russia, Mexico, Brazil, Spain, and many others. The island is not cut off from global commerce. Its problem is not that the world is forbidden from trading with Cuba. Its problem is that the Cuban state has destroyed trust, productivity, and financial credibility.
There is also the American supplier paradox. Despite U.S. sanctions, the United States remains one of Cuba’s important suppliers of essential goods. Under humanitarian exceptions, Cuba regularly purchases large quantities of chicken, soy, corn, medicine, and other basic goods from American companies.
The restriction is not that Cuba cannot buy these goods. The restriction is that Cuba generally must pay cash, up front, without access to normal U.S. credit. That is not a blockade. That is a credit-risk rule applied to a government with a long history of default.
Cuba’s Serial Insolvency
Cuba’s lack of access to international credit is not simply the result of a conspiracy. It is also the predictable result of becoming a serially insolvent debtor.
Over decades, the Cuban government has accumulated large debts with creditors such as the Paris Club, Russia, China, and others. Again and again, it has failed to honor commitments, renegotiated obligations, delayed payments, or defaulted.
Financial isolation, therefore, is not only political. It is also the market’s response to risk. Lenders do not trust the Cuban government because the Cuban government has repeatedly shown that it cannot, or will not, pay its debts.
GAESA: The State Within the State
The real heart of the Cuban economy is GAESA — Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. — a massive business conglomerate controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces.
GAESA is not just another state company. It functions as a state within the state.
It controls major sectors of the Cuban economy, including tourism, logistics, retail stores, remittances, import channels, hotels, and foreign-currency operations. Through companies such as Gaviota and other military-linked entities, GAESA captures much of the hard currency that enters the island.
This creates an economic apartheid.
For tourists and foreign-currency customers, there is abundance: hotels, restaurants, alcohol, imported food, transportation, and luxury resorts. For ordinary Cubans, there is rationing, scarcity, medicine shortages, collapsing infrastructure, and blackouts.
One economy serves foreigners and the military-business elite. The other economy traps the Cuban people in poverty.
Tourism, Opacity, and Misallocated Resources
The regime claims it lacks resources, but its own investment priorities tell a different story.
For years, Cuba has continued pouring money into hotels and tourism infrastructure while agriculture, housing, hospitals, electrical systems, transportation, and water systems deteriorate. Many of these hotels remain underused, yet the construction continues.
Why?
Because tourism generates hard currency, and hard currency is controlled by the regime’s military-business network.
Instead of reinvesting tourism revenue into local agriculture, energy production, hospitals, or civil infrastructure, the regime channels money into the sectors it controls most tightly. This is not normal economic development. It is a system designed to preserve power.
Even small private businesses — the so-called MIPYMES — are tolerated only within limits. The regime allows them when useful, restricts them when threatening, and prevents any truly independent economic class from gaining enough strength to challenge state control.
Food distribution, imports, currency access, and licenses remain political tools.
The End of Subsidies and the Energy Collapse
For decades, Cuba survived through external subsidies.
First, the Soviet Union propped up the island with oil, trade preferences, and financial support. Later, Venezuela became the new sponsor, sending subsidized oil that Cuba could consume, resell, or use to obtain hard currency.
That model has collapsed.
Venezuela’s own production crisis reduced the flow of cheap oil. Sanctions and financial pressure made the oil trade more difficult. At the same time, Cuba failed to modernize its energy system. Its thermoelectric plants are old, undermaintained, and increasingly unreliable.
The result is a national power crisis.
The blackouts are not just an accident. They are the consequence of decades of bad priorities. The regime invested in hotels while the electrical grid rotted. It protected tourism while ordinary Cubans lost electricity, refrigeration, transportation, and basic economic function.
The Bottom Line
The narrative of the “blockade” serves the Cuban government as a convenient geopolitical excuse. It allows the regime to blame outside forces while hiding the failure of its own centralized and militarized economic system.
Cuba’s scarcity is not created only from outside. Much of it is created internally.
It is the result of deliberate political choices: control over production, control over food, control over currency, control over imports, control over credit, and control over opportunity.
Cuba today operates less like a normal country and more like a private holding company controlled by a military caste. That caste manages the flow of dollars, euros, remittances, imports, hotels, and strategic assets for its own survival.
The Cuban people are left with ration books, empty pharmacies, broken hospitals, collapsing power plants, and a future held hostage by the same system that created the crisis.
This is not just an ideological debate.
It is an accounting question.
The resources exist. The money flows. The goods enter the island. The hotels are built. The military companies profit.
But the Cuban people are not the priority.
Power is.
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